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I. INTRODUCTION
At the far end of town
where the Grickle-grass grows
and the wind smells slow-and-sour when it blows
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Dawn M. Kurz, B.A., 2001, Doane College; J.D. expected 2009, University of Ne-
braska College of Law (NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW, Executive Editor, 2008).
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and no birds ever sing excepting old crows...
is the Street of the Lifted Lorax.
And deep in the Grickle-grass, some people say,
if you look deep enough you can still see, today,
where the Lorax once stood
just as long as it could
before somebody lifted the Lorax away.
What was the Lorax?
And why was it there?
And why was it lifted and taken somewhere
from the far end of town where the Grickle-grass grows?
The old Once-ler still lives here.
Ask him. He knows. 1
In Dr. Seuss' world, the Lorax was a creature that spoke for the
trees. The Lorax issued warnings and even resorted to pleas. But the
old Once-ler refused to heed any advice and continued to cut down the
Truffala Trees. Soon there was nothing left but pollution and smog,
and the Lorax and all of his friends had no choice but to leave.
Global warming is a divisive issue. Traditionally, it has been envi-
ronmentalists on one side of the debate and industrialists on the
other. However, as scientific evidence continues to mount, societies
are becoming increasingly conscious of the effects that human activi-
ties have on the environment. Concerns are mounting and the stakes
are increasing for those on both sides of the issue. The center of the
global warming debate involves two questions: (1) Is the Earth warm-
ing because of natural phenomenon or because of human-related ac-
tivities? (2) What action, if any, should society take to minimize the
impact of global warming? In Massachusetts v. EPA,2 the battle en-
tered the courtroom after twelve states, four local governments, and
twelve private organizations ("Petitioners") unsuccessfully petitioned
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), seeking greenhouse
gas regulation.3
The Petitioners requested that the agency regulate four green-
house gases under section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act ("CAA").4
Section 202(a)(1) requires the Administrator to regulate the emission
of any air pollutant from any new motor vehicle, which the Adminis-
trator determines may contribute to air pollution and endanger public
health or welfare.5 The EPA, supported by ten intervening states and
six trade associations, argued that the issue was not justiciable be-
cause the Petitioners did not have standing to invoke the jurisdiction
of the Court under Article III of the Constitution.
6
1. DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX 1-3 (1971).
2. Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) [hereinafter Massachusetts II].
3. Id. at 1446.
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
6. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446-47.
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In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court issued two hold-
ings-the first covered the procedural aspects of the case, and the sec-
ond addressed the merits. The Court issued a 5-4 decision holding
that at least one Petitioner-Massachusetts-had standing to exer-
cise the jurisdiction of the court. 7 The majority reasoned that Massa-
chusetts had "special solicitude" in the Court's standing analysis and
that Massachusetts demonstrated the requisite injury-in-fact, tracea-
bility, and redressability to establish standing.S The Court also ruled
5-4 that the EPA does have the statutory authority to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions from new motor vehicles.9 The majority held that if
the EPA elects not to regulate carbon dioxide under the CAA, the rea-
son for refusing must be consistent with the CAA.1O
The purpose of this Note is twofold: first, to analyze the reasoning
used by the majority in determining that Massachusetts had standing
and explore the effect that the majority's reasoning will have on future
cases; second, to investigate the potential consequences of the Court's
decision that carbon dioxide is an air pollutant under the language of
the CAA.
In order to analyze the Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA, it
is necessary to first look at the underlying issue of global warming and
the legal background of the CAA. In analyzing the procedural aspects
of the case, it is necessary to look at the development of the standing
doctrine and particularly its use in environmental cases. Part II of
this Note explores the science surrounding climate change. This Part
also gives a concise history of the CAA provisions relating to motor
vehicle emissions and reviews the prerequisites necessary to establish
standing for jurisdictional purposes. Part III discusses the original
rulemaking request by the Petitioners to regulate greenhouse gases,
and the EPA's denial of this request. Part III also examines the ad-
vancement of Massachusetts v. EPA through the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court. Part IV will analyze the potential implications of
the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA exploring (1) the
possibility of administrative action and regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions under the current CAA; (2) increased pressure on Congress
to enact new legislation requiring mandatory reductions in green-
house gas emissions; (3) increased state and local action to curb green-
house gas emissions in the absence of federal action; and (4) the
ramifications for industry, including the possible establishment of a
carbon credit trading scheme.
7. Id. at 1452-58.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1459-62.
10. Id. at 1462-64.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Science of Global Warming
Global mean surface temperatures have risen by 0.74 degrees Cel-
sius over the past 100 years.l The debate over this observed warm-
ing trend is whether it is the result of natural phenomena or whether
human activities have been a contributing factor. The Earth has a
naturally occurring greenhouse effect.12 This greenhouse effect is the
process by which certain gases in the atmosphere trap heat emitted
from the planet's surface resulting in an added warming of the
planet's atmosphere and surface.13 In the absence of this warming
effect, surface temperatures would be approximately 33 degrees Cel-
sius cooler-meaning it would be too cold for most organisms to
survive. 14
The gases that lead to the warming effect, commonly known as
greenhouse gases, include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
ozone, and water vapor. 15 Scientists have observed an increase in the
amount of these greenhouse gases present in the atmosphere. 16 Many
scientists attributed the increase to human activities, but met resis-
tance from those skeptical that human activities were impacting the
natural process. 17 It is now widely accepted that humans have con-
11. Kevin Trenberth et al., 2007: Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION
OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 237 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter IPCC Observations]. This would be the equivalent
of between one to two degrees Fahrenheit.
12. See Herv6 Le Treut et al., 2007: Historical Overview of Climate Change, in CLI-
MATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 115-16 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2007) [hereinafter IPCC Historical Overview] (explaining the greenhouse effect);
Tom M.L. Wigley, The Science of Climate Change: Global and U.S. Perspectives,
in PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 3-4 (explaining the existence of the
"natural greenhouse effect"); EPA, Climate Change Science, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/science/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009) (providing a brief
overview).
13. See IPCC Historical Overview, supra note 12, at 115-16.
14. EPA, supra note 12; Wigley, supra note 12, at 4. This would be the equivalent of
66 degrees Fahrenheit.
15. Wigley, supra note 12, at 4.
16. Richard B. Alley et al., 2007: Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 2 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter
IPCC Policymaker Report].
17. See, e.g., Richard S. Lindzen, Global Warming: The Origin and Nature of the Al.
leged Scientific Consensus, REG.: CATO REV. Bus. & GOV'T, Spring 1992, at 87
(arguing that the issue of global warming is scientifically controversial).
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tributed to the increased levels of greenhouse gases by burning fossil
fuels.' 8
Scientists first began to explore the possibility that the climate is
sensitive to the atmospheric level of gases over a century ago. In 1824,
Joseph Fourier proposed the possibility of a greenhouse effect.19
Building on this idea, Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius predicted
that a change in atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide coincided with
glacial advances and retreats. 20 However, scientists did not begin
measuring the current atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide until
1958.21 While these measurements have allowed scientists to sepa-
rate out human-related fossil fuel emissions from those that occur nat-
urally, it is still necessary to compare this data with a longer-term
record of carbon dioxide occurrences in the atmosphere. 2 2 Scientists
have been able to obtain historic levels of greenhouse gas concentra-
tions from ice core samples taken in Antarctica and Greenland. 2 3 Pre-
industrial levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide measured approxi-
mately 270 to 280 parts per million by volume ("ppm").24 The 2005
level was 379 ppm. 2 5 2005 was one of the warmest years on record.
26
Eleven of the last twelve years rank among the warmest on record for
surface temperatures. 27 The scientific evidence supports the conclu-
sion that human activities have contributed to the rise in greenhouse
gas levels and the corresponding effect of global climate change. The
CAA is the best existing legislation that can be invoked to manage this
issue.
18. See EPA, supra note 12; IPCC Historical Overview, supra note 12, at 103 (noting
that natural factors alone cannot account for the climate changes observed and
that a "substantial" influence of human activities is necessary to explain the
changes).
19. IPCC Historical Overview, supra note 12, at 103 (Fourier hypothesized that "the
temperature [of the Earth] can be augmented by the interposition of the atmos-
phere, because heat in the state of light finds less resistance in penetrating the
air, than in repassing into the air when converted into non-luminous heat" after
being influenced by greenhouse experiments of Horace Benedict de Saussure.).
20. Id. at 105.
21. Id. at 100 (noting that Charles David Keeling began measuring the current at-
mospheric levels of carbon dioxide in 1958 on Mauna Loa in Hawaii).
22. Id.
23. Id. (explaining that this data comes from air bubbles preserved in the ice cores
and noting the record now goes back nearly one million years).
24. IPCC Policymaker Report, supra note 16, at 2; Wigley, supra note 12, at 5. PPM
is the ratio of the number of greenhouse gas molecules to the total number of
molecules of dry air.
25. IPCC Policymaker Report, supra note 16, at 2 (explaining this level exceeds the
natural range over the last 650,000 years).
26. IPCC Observations, supra note 11, at 237. Since 1850, 1998 and 2005 were the
two warmest years on record. Id.
27. Id. With the exception of 1996, 1995 through 2006 were the warmest years on
record since 1850. Id.
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B. The Clean Air Act: The Statutory Basis for the Petition
Congress has enacted a volume of legislation-including the
CAA-that touches on the issue of greenhouse gases and global warm-
ing, but none of it clearly mandates the regulation of these gases. In
1963, Congress passed the CAA to protect the quality of the nation's
air resources. 28 The original act left the primary responsibility of reg-
ulation to the states and authorized expanded research efforts, finan-
cial assistance for state and local governments, and assistance for the
development of regional air control programs. 29 Section 6 of the CAA
provided: "The Secretary shall encourage the continued efforts ... to
prevent pollutants from being discharged from the exhaust of automo-
bile vehicles."30
Disappointed with the results, and amidst a growing concern for
widespread air pollution, Congress substantially amended the CAA in
1970, increasing federal responsibility and authority.31 The 1970
Amendments established technology-based emission standards for
motor vehicles and gave the newly created EPA the authority to regu-
late hazardous air pollutants. 32
In 1977, Congress amended section 202(a)(1) 3 3 of the CAA to its
present form:
The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time revise)
in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
28. Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. For background informa-
tion on events leading up to the passage of the Clean Air Act, see Roy S. BELDEN,
THE CLEAN AIR ACT 5-9 (2001) (discussing the Air Pollution Control Act of 1955,
the 1963 Clean Air Act, and subsequent amendments); Train v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63-64 (1975) (discussing the 1955 Congressional au-
thorization of the Surgeon General to study air pollution and in 1960 directing
the Surgeon General to examine the health hazards of motor vehicle emissions).
29. Clean Air Act of 1963 § 1.
30. Id. § 6. In section 9 of the Clean Air Act of 1963, Secretary is defined as the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and "[a]ll language referring to ad-
verse effects on welfare shall include but not be limited to injury to agricultural
crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration of property, and hazards to
transportation." Id. § 9.
31. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). Congress previously amended the CAA
in 1965 and 1966 to increase federal authority to control motor vehicle emissions.
See Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965) (establishing section 201 for the regu-
lation of emissions from new motor vehicles); Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954
(1966); see also Philip White, Jr., Annotation, Clean Air Act, 7 A.L.R. FED. 2D 357,
§ 2 (2005).
32. BELDEN, supra note 28, at 6-7.
33. It is under this provision that the Petitioners in Massachusetts II sought regula-
tory action by the EPA.
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pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare.
3 4
This amendment endorsed the D.C. Circuit's decision in Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, which held that the EPA was allowed to take regulatory action
to prevent harm where risk was found to be significant.
35
Section 202(a)(1) gives the EPA authority to regulate the emissions
of air pollutants from new motor vehicles. The U.S. transportation
system is the largest in the world and is instrumental in the stability
and growth of the economy. 36 Americans travel 4.8 trillion person-
miles every year, and in 2001 alone 3.7 trillion ton-miles of freight
were moved. 37 All of this activity makes transportation a major emit-
ter of greenhouse gases. Transportation accounts for over one-third of
the carbon dioxide emitted in the United States.3S Carbon dioxide
emissions from transportation are increasing faster than any other
sector.39 With the exception of China, the United States transporta-
tion sector emits more carbon dioxide than any other nation's entire
economy.40 Despite the size of the transportation sector and volume
of carbon dioxide that results from this activity, there has been much
confusion as to whether the CAA actually applies to carbon dioxide
emissions. 4 1
In 1990, Congress again made significant amendments to the CAA,
this time considering carbon dioxide directly.42 A committee version
of the bill included a provision to limit carbon dioxide emissions from
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006). The current "reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare" language is less strict than the previous standard of
"which endangers the public health or welfare." See Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct.
at 1447 n.7.
35. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (which held that the Clean
Air Act calls for action to prevent harm 'even if the regulator is less than certain
that harm is otherwise inevitable"); H.R. REP. No. 95-294 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1127 (stating the committee's action is intended to sup-
port the majority opinion in Ethyl).
36. David L. Greene & Andreas Schafer, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions From
U.S. Transportation, in PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2003).
37. Id.
38. Id. at iii.
39. Id. at 3.
40. Id. at 2.
41. For example, former EPA General Counsel Gary Guzy stated "C0 2 is in the class
of compounds that could be subject to several of the Clean Air Act's regulatory
approaches." Before a Joint Hearing of the Subcomm. on Economic Growth, Nat-
ural Resources and Regulatory Affairs of the H.R. Comm. on Government Reform
and the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the H.R. Comm. On Science,
106th Cong. (Oct. 6, 1999) (testimony of Gary S. Guzy, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency), available at httpJ/www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/
testimony/106_1999 2000/10699gg.htm.
42. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990). The 1990 Amendments contained
stricter standards for motor vehicle tailpipe emissions of hydrocarbons and nitro-
gen oxides. Id.
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light duty vehicles.4 3 The Senate Report stated that emissions from
motor vehicles in the United States were a "significant portion" of car-
bon dioxide worldwide and that motor vehicles "produce one-quarter
of the carbon dioxide emitted in the United States."44 The intent of
adopting the standards in the bill was not to significantly reduce the
existing emission levels, but to prevent the current levels from in-
creasing.45 Congress abandoned the provision in conference commit-
tee and it was not enacted as part of the 1990 CAA Amendments.
46
Those supporting the view that greenhouse gases-carbon dioxide,
in particular-should not be regulated under the CAA argue that the
legislative history of the 1990 Amendments establish that Congress
did not recognize the CAA as authorizing the EPA to regulate green-
house gases.47 As additional support that Congress did not intend for
the CAA to cover carbon dioxide, those opposed to regulation under
the CAA also cite various Congressional discussions and legislative
actions regarding the treatment of greenhouse gases. None of this leg-
islation clearly called for the regulation of greenhouse gases.
In 1978, Congress passed the National Climate Program Act to im-
prove the understanding of climate change, its causes, and the "social,
economic, and political implications of [global] climate change"
through research and information sharing.48 In 1987, Congress
passed the Global Climate Protection Act instructing the EPA to de-
:velop a coordinated national policy on global climate change and di-
rected the Secretary of State to coordinate negotiations regarding
climate change.4 9 In 1990, Congress passed the Global Change Re-
search Act, which established the Committee on Earth and Environ-
43. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3484-85
(setting emissions standards for light duty vehicles at no more than 266 grams
per mile for model years 1996 to 1999 and no more than 220 grams beginning in
model year 2000). Light duty vehicles are those with a gross weight of 8,500
pounds or less. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The Senate Report stated, "Reducing CO 2 from light duty vehicles will not
solve the global warming problem. No single measure will. But the necessity for
taking steps now is becoming more apparent as more scientific information be-
comes available." Id.
46. H.R. REP. No. 101-952, at 336-38 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3867, 3868-70.
47. Bradford C. Mank, Standing And Global Warming: Is Injury To All Injury To
None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 67 n. 456 (2005). The 1990 CAA Amendments also created
a stratospheric ozone program, which critics cite as further proof that Congress
did not intend to regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant. Id.
48. Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2901
(2006)).
49. Pub. L. No. 100-204, tit. XI, 101 Stat. 1407 (1987), amended by Pub. L. No. 103-
199, 107 Stat. 2327 (1993) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006)).
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mental Sciences to coordinate a research program. 50 This legislation
was enacted one day after the 1990 CAA Amendments were signed
into law.
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change ("UNFCC") was convened in Rio de Janeiro. Countries agreed
to reductions in order to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in
the atmosphere. However, such reductions were voluntary as coun-
tries wished "to enable economic development to proceed in a sustain-
able manner."51 Parties to the UNFCC later negotiated the Kyoto
Protocol, which established mandatory reductions in the greenhouse
gas emissions of developed nations. 52 The U.S. Senate refused to rat-
ify the Kyoto Protocol because it did not place restrictions on develop-
ing nations such as India and China.53 Instead, Congress
unanimously adopted the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, which stated that
the United States should not participate in any protocol that failed to
require mandatory reductions for developing nations or that might
otherwise harm the economy. 54
Those supporting the position that carbon dioxide and other green-
house gases were not intended to be regulated under the CAA argue
that Congress had multiple opportunities to regulate carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases in these numerous acts-including the
1990 CAA Amendments-and elected not for regulation, but instead
chose further study. 55 Despite the history of the CAA and Congress's
less than stellar record in establishing a definitive program for green-
house gas legislation, Petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA thought the
language of the CAA was broad enough to encompass greenhouse
gases in its regulatory scheme and initially sought action from the
EPA. However, the EPA was not convinced that the Petitioners had
standing to advance the claim through the federal court system.
C. Standing
Petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA first submitted a rulemaking
request to the EPA, asking the EPA to regulate greenhouse gases
under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA.56 The EPA denied the rulemaking
request and Petitioners filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals
50. Pub. L. No. 101-606, 104 Stat. 3096 (1990) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2921
(2006)).
51. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2, opened for
signature June 4, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
52. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 22, 33.
53. Mank, supra note 47, at 19.
54. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S8138 (1997) (enacted).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
56. See infra section III.A.
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for the District of Columbia. 57 The EPA raised objections, arguing
that Petitioners did not have "standing" to bring the case in federal
court. 58
Article III of the United States Constitution extends judicial power
to "cases" and "controversies."59 These two words have been the sub-
ject of much legal interpretation. The Constitution makes no open ref-
erence to the requirement of standing.60 In fact, "standing" was not
recognized as an Article III limitation until 1944.61 However, the
principle of standing had been relied upon in earlier cases.6 2 Al-
though, in these cases, standing required "a legal right to bring suit"
recognized by the Constitution, by statute, or by common law.63 If no
right to sue existed under the common law or from an Act of Congress,
then no Article III case or controversy existed. 64 Under the modern
standing doctrine, a party could have a legal right to bring a suit, but
still not meet the requirements necessary to establish standing.6 5
Commentators suggest that Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter
were responsible for developing the modern doctrine of standing.66
The creation of New Deal legislation in the mid-to-late 1930s and the
formation of the administrative state added to the caseload of an al-
ready strained court system.6 7 Critics argue that what started out as
57. See infra section III.B-C.
58. See infra section III.C.
59. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
60. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 169 (1992). Article III indirectly
limits the judicial power by only allowing the courts to hear cases and controver-
sies, thus precluding the court from issuing advisory opinions. Id. at 168.
61. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944) (discussing "standing to sue" as having
a legally protected right).
62. Sunstein, supra note 60, at 170-71 (noting that from until approximately 1920
there was no separate standing doctrine but that cases in the 1920s and 1930s
relied on the notions of standing).
63. Id. at 170 (noting that even someone with a concrete interest could not sue unless
a source of law had conferred the right to do so). Under this legal standard, Peti-
tioners would have easily been able to meet the requirement as the Clean Air Act
authorizes a procedural right. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006).
64. Sunstein, supra note 60, at 170. Personal and economic interests were not suffi-
cient. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRO-
CESS 359 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that a "mere personal or economic interest as not
sufficient").
65. See Sunstein, supra note 60, at 170 (providing the example of citizen suits).
66. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1443-52 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 60, at 179-81; David
R. Hodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can Anyone Complain About the
Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 458-59 (2000) (discussing Justices
Brandeis and Frankfurter's attempts to protect New Deal legislation from judi-
cial attack).
67. Winter, supra note 66, at 1452-53 (noting the large caseload of federal courts
results from several factors including the creation of the federal question jurisdic-
tion statute, removal jurisdiction, and the creation of administrative law).
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a doctrine of justiciability has become a tool used by courts to screen
cases. The doctrine of standing has evolved to effectively limit access
to the courts by establishing prerequisites that must be met before a
court will hear the merits of the case. 68
Modern standing requires a party to have a "sufficient stake" in
order to obtain a judicial resolution of a controversy. 69 To establish
standing, a party must demonstrate they have suffered an "injury in
fact," that the injury is "fairly traceable" to the actions of the opposing
party, and is redressable by the relief requested from the court. 70 In
other words, standing requires: (1) an injury; (2) traceability; and (3)
redressability. The burden of proof is on the party seeking to invoke
the jurisdiction of the court, and these elements must be established
before the court can proceed to the merits. 7 1
The "injury in fact" test was recognized in 1970.72 Injury in fact is
"an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hy-
pothetical."7 3 A mere interest in the problem is not sufficient to estab-
lish an injury. Categories of injury can include aesthetic,
conservational, recreational, and economic, but to establish an injury
in fact, "the party himself must have suffered an injury."74
The traceability and redressability requirements were recognized
in 1973. 75 Traceability requires the party bringing the action to
demonstrate "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of."76 Traceability is essentially a causation requirement,
but does not require a tort standard of causation. 77 Redressability is
achieved by showing "that it be likely, as opposed to merely specula-
tive, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."78
68. See Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Envi-
ronmental Standing, 11 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 323 (2001) (arguing that
"standing rules appear to have been motivated by political concerns").
69. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972).
70. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
71. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.
72. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) and Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) were both decided on March 3, 1970
and both referenced "injury in fact".
73. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
74. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738 (noting the Court recognized broad categories of
injury in Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 154).
75. See Winter, supra note 66, at 1379 (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614
(1973) and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)).
76. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
77. See Tozzi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 308 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (stating that "we have never applied a 'tort' standard of causation to the
question of traceability"); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560.
78. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 167; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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Redressability requires that a favorable ruling will provide at least
some relief to the injured party.
79
Courts traditionally took a lenient approach to standing in envi-
ronmental cases. In Sierra Club v. Morton, the plaintiff-an environ-
mental group-sought an injunction to prevent federal officials from
approving a skiing development in the Mineral King Valley.SO The
Court held that Sierra Club did not have standing because the group
had not sufficiently alleged an injury demonstrating that it, or any of
its members, would be affected by the actions of the defendant.S1
However, the Court did recognize that "[a]esthetic and environmental
well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the
quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmen-
tal interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not
make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial pro-
cess."8 2 In Sierra Club, Justice Douglas' dissent went so far as to ar-
gue that inanimate objects should be given standing for the purposes
of environmental litigation.8 3
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures ("SCRAP"), a group of law students, along with other environ-
mental groups, alleged that a new rate structure sought by railroads
would cause its members "economic, recreational, and aesthetic
harm."8 4 The Court recognized the stated injuries as "less direct and
perceptible[,]" but found that "the fact that Appellees here claimed
only a harm to their use and enjoyment of the natural resources of the
Washington area" did not deprive them of standing.8 5
79. Tozzi, 271 F.3d at 310 (holding that to meet the redressability element only re-
quires a petitioner to show it would receive at least some relief).
80. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728-30.
81. Id. at 734-35. The Sierra Club only alleged that the development "would destroy
or otherwise adversely affect the scenery, natural and historic objects and wildlife
of the park and would impair the enjoyment of the park for future generations."
Id.
82. Id. at 734. In Sierra Club, the Sierra Club alleged that it had a special interest in
the conservation of national parks and sought to prevent development in the Si-
erra Nevada Mountains, which would result in development of a portion of the
Sequoia National Forest. The Court held Sierra Club did not meet the injury in
fact test because they did not allege that it, or any of its members, would be in-
jured. Id.
83. Id. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 678 (1973).
85. Id. at 686-88. The court also stated that to deny standing where many others are
injured would "mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions
could be questioned by nobody." Id. at 688.
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However, with Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation8 6 ("Lujan I")
and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife87 ("Lujan II"), the requirements for
standing became increasingly difficult for plaintiffs in environmental.
suits. In Lujan I, the plaintiffs sought to challenge the criteria used
by the Department of Interior to reclassify permitted uses on federal
lands.8 8 Several members of the group alleged that they hiked in the
vicinity of the area and that their aesthetic and environmental inter-
ests would be harmed by the mining activities.8 9 The Court ulti-
mately found that the injury-in-fact requirement had not been
adequately alleged despite the affidavits submitted by members of the
citizens group claiming personal injury.90
In Lujan II, plaintiffs sued to challenge a Department of Interior
ruling that the Endangered Species Act did not apply to federal action
outside the United States. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion
stating that once again an adequate injury had not been established.91
Two of the members had alleged injury through an inability to observe
certain endangered animals at some future point in time as a result of
federal funds being directed toward the Aswan Damn project in
Egypt.92 However, the members had not given an exact date as to
when they might return to observe these animals.93 Emphasizing a
more strict standard for injury-in-fact, the majority stated, "Vhere
there is no actual harm ... its imminence must be established."94
With the background and requirements for establishing standing
in mind-a concrete and actual or imminent injury, traceability of
this injury to the actions of the EPA, and redressability or the possibil-
ity of some relief that can be achieved by a favorable decision-the
Petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA first proceeded through the avail-
able administrative channels of the EPA with their request.
86. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) [hereinafter Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n].
87. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
88. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 875-79.
89. Id. at 880.
90. Id. at 888-89. The Court said that alleging hiking in the vicinity was insufficient
to show aesthetic or environmental harm caused by the Department of Interior.
Id.
91. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-64.
92. Id. at 563-64.
93. Id. at 565.
94. Id. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy suggested the standing require-
ment could have been met if the Plaintiffs had a specific date of return or had
purchased plane tickets. Id. at 579-581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE
A. Rulemaking Request
On October 20, 1999, twelve states, three cities, an American terri-
tory, and several environmental organizations requested that the EPA
regulate carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluoro-
carbons under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA.95 Petitioners argued that
these greenhouse gases met the definition of air pollutant as defined
in section 302(g). Section 302(g) of the CAA defines an air pollutant as
"any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters ambient air."
96
Citing numerous scientific studies, Petitioners asserted that these
gases, especially carbon dioxide emitted by motor vehicles, signifi-
cantly contribute to global climate change.97 Section 202 requires the
Administrator to regulate those air pollutants that can reasonably be
found to "endanger public health or welfare."98 Section 302(h) of the
CAA defines welfare expansively including, but not limited to, "effects
on soils, waters, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wild-
life, weather, visibility and climate . . ."99
The petitioners also relied on a memorandum written in 1998 by
former General Counsel of the EPA, Jonathan Cannon. Mr. Cannon
expressed to then-EPA Administrator, Carol Browner, the legal opin-
ion that the CAA granted the EPA "broad authority" to address pollu-
tants.10 0 This memorandum asserted that the CAA definition of "air
pollutant" covered carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and
mercury.' 0 1 The memorandum also stated that Congress had already
recognized carbon dioxide as a pollutant under section 103(g) of the
95. For a discussion of the Clean Air Act, see supra section II.B. Section 202(a)(1)
gives the Administrator authority to regulate "air pollutants" emitted from new
motor vehicles which the Administrator deems may endanger public health or
welfare. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006).
97. Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,923 (Sept. 8, 2003).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (emphasis added).
100. Memorandum from Jonathan Cannon, EPA Gen. Counsel, to Carol Browner,
EPA Adm'r, EPA's Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric Power
Generation Sources (Apr. 10, 1998), available at http://www.law.umaryland.edul
faculty/bpercivallcasebook/documents/EPACO2memol.pdf [hereinafter Cannon
Memorandum]. The legal opinion of Jonathan Cannon was prepared as a result
of a request by Congressman DeLay requesting clarification of a statement he
read in an EPA document stating that EPA currently has authority under the
CAA to establish pollution control requirements for carbon dioxide and several
other pollutants created during electric power generation.
101. Cannon Memorandum, supra note 100.
1068 [Vol. 87:1055
THE RETURN OF THE LORAX
CAA.102 Mr. Cannon maintained that "[a] substance can be an air
pollutant even though it is naturally present in air in some quanti-
ties."1 0 3 The memorandum noted that several provisions of the CAA,
including section 202(a)(1), link the EPA's authority to regulate with a
precautionary standard that the Administrator need only make a de-
termination that the air pollutant could have "potential harmful ef-
fects."10 4 Gary Guzy, Mr. Cannon's successor, also affirmed that the
EPA had authority under the CAA to regulate carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases.10 5 Petitioners argued that these statements
along with other statements made on the EPA's website amounted to
an EPA finding that greenhouse gases "may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare."1o6
B. The Denial
The EPA solicited public comments regarding the rulemaking peti-
tion submitted by Petitioners and received over 50,000 submis-
sions.' 0 7 The EPA also requested assistance from the National
Research Council to evaluate Petitioners' request. In its report, the
National Research Council stated:
Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of
human activities .... Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes observed
over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but we
cannot rule out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection
of natural variability.
0 8
Despite this pronouncement, the EPA seized on language stating "a
causal linkage between the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere and the observed climate changes during the twentieth century
cannot be unequivocally established."109
The EPA denied Petitioners' request on several grounds, finding
first that it did not have the authority to regulate greenhouse gases
102. Id. Section 103(g) authorizes EPA to conduct research and develop nonregu-
latory strategies for preventing air pollution including strategies for "preventing
or reducing multiple air pollutants, including sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides,
heavy metals, PM-10 (particulate matter), carbon monoxide, and carbon dioxide."
42 U.S.C. § 7403(g) (2006).
103. Cannon Memorandum, supra note 100.
104. Id. Mr. Cannon noted that sections 108, 109, 111(b), 112, 115, 202(a), 211(c), 231,
612, and 615 share this similar feature.
105. Mank, supra note 47, at 66.
106. Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,923 (Sept. 8, 2003).
107. Id. at 52,924.
108. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME OF
THE KEY QUESTIONS 1 (2001).
109. Id.
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under the CAA.110 The EPA went on to state that even if it did have
authority, it would decline to exercise that authority at this time.''
The EPA cited potential conflicts with then-President Bush's climate
change policy and other foreign policy implications in declining to reg-
ulate. 112 Robert Fabricant, the acting EPA General Counsel, with-
drew the Cannon memorandum and drafted a new opinion stating
that the EPA did not have the authority to regulate carbon dioxide
under the CAA, which the EPA relied upon in denying the petition.113
C. Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed suit in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia challenging the EPA's denial.114 The EPA argued that Peti-
tioners had not sufficiently alleged that their injuries were "caused by
EPA's decision not to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from mo-
bile sources" or that their injuries could "be redressed by a decision in
their favor."11 5 Petitioners presented evidence from a climatologist
and a mechanical engineer that carbon dioxide reductions from motor
vehicles would reduce the impacts of global warming.116
The three-judge panel split three ways on the question of standing.
Judge Randolph, writing for the court, recognized that Steel Co. v. Cit-
izens for a Better Environment "instructs federal courts to resolve Arti-
cle III standing questions before proceeding to the merits of a case."11
7
However, Judge Randolph believed that because the standing ques-
tions were intertwined with the merits, the court had three options: to
(1) refer the standing issue to a special master for determination; (2)
remand to the EPA for a determination on causation and redres-
sability; or (3) proceed to the merits."18 Judge Randolph adopted the
third approach stating, "We will therefore assume arguendo that EPA
has statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases from motor vehi-
cles."1 19 Proceeding to the merits, Judge Randolph determined that
the EPA properly denied the rulemaking petition.1
20
110. Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,925.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 52,929 & n.3. Mr. Fabricant stated a substance must also be an "air pollu-
tion agent" to meet the CAA definition of air pollutant. Id. at 52,928.
114. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Massachusetts
A1.
115. Id. at 54.
116. Id. at 54-55.
117. Id. at 55 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83
(1998)).
118. Id. at 55.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Judge Sentelle concurred in the judgment-establishing a major-
ity-but dissented on the issue of standing, finding that Petitioners
had not established a sufficient injury in fact.121 Judge Sentelle
stated that "after plowing through reams of affidavits and arguments"
the petitioners had "alleged and shown no harm particularized to
themselves."122 Judge Sentelle concluded that a generally held griev-
ance common to all members of the public was not sufficient to estab-
lish standing.123
Judge Tatel dissented on both the standing issue and the mer-
its.124 Judge Tatel found that Massachusetts had met the injury,
traceability, and redressability requirements set forth in Lujan 11.125
Judge Tatel stated that the rising sea levels alleged by Massachusetts
were sufficient to demonstrate a particularized injury.12 6 Further-
more, he reasoned that the allegations-that greenhouse gas emis-
sions from motor vehicles contributed to global warming and that
reductions in these emissions would reduce or delay global warming-
satisfied the standards for traceability and redressability. x2 7 Citing
the plain language of the statute, Judge Tatel determined that the
statutory language of the CAA gave the EPA authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. Judge Tatel held that
the EPA had not stated a lawful explanation under the statute for its
decision not to regulate.128
D. The Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari stating, "[Tihe unusual
importance of the underlying issue persuaded us to grant the writ."'12 9
In a 5-4 decision the Court found that at least one petitioner, Massa-
chusetts, had standing to invoke jurisdiction and held that the EPA
has the statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA because such gases fall within the
CAA's definition of "air pollutant."'130 Finally, the Court found the
only way for the EPA to avoid this statutory obligation was to "ground
its reasons for action or inaction."131 Reversing the decision of the
121. Id. at 59.
122. Id. at 59-60.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 61 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 64.
126. Id. at 64-65.
127. Id. at 65.
128. Id. at 74 (noting that Congress did not grant the EPA broad authority "to with-
hold regulation because it thinks such regulation bad policy").
129. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1447 (2007).
130. Id. at 1452-63.
131. Id. at 1463.
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Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court remanded the case. 13 2 This rul-
ing requires the EPA to reconsider the petition and decide whether
the four greenhouse gases cited by Petitioners endanger public health
or welfare; if the EPA still elects not to regulate, it must ground its
reasons for inaction in the language of the CAA.133 Justice Stevens
delivered the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. 13 4 Chief Justice Roberts dissented, along with
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.135
The opening paragraph of Justice Stevens' majority opinion states,
"A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided with a
significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the at-
mosphere. Respected scientists believe the two trends are related."
13 6
Despite the grandeur of this opening statement, the Court did not ad-
dress the merits of the case until it had established that at least one
petitioner, Massachusetts, had standing to invoke the jurisdiction of
the Court under Article III of the Constitution.
The Court stated it was of "considerable relevance" that the party
seeking review was a sovereign State rather than a private individ-
ual.13 7 Justice Stevens noted:
When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.
Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in gas emis-
sions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in
some circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-
vehicle emissions might well be pre-empted .... These sovereign prerogatives
are now lodged in the Federal Government, and Congress has ordered EPA to
protect Massachusetts (among others) .... Congress has moreover recognized
a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking
petition as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural right and Massa-
chusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth
is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.
1 3 8
The Court found that the EPA's refusal to regulate carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases created a redressable harm for
Massachusetts.1
3 9
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1463.
134. Id. at 1444.
135. Id. at 1438.
136. Id. at 1446.
137. Id. at 1454. The majority cited a 1907 case, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. 230, 237 (1907), in support of its proposition that states are not normal liti-
gants. In Tennessee Copper, Georgia sought an injunction, alleging an injury to
its own land and the lands of its citizens due to noxious gas discharged by neigh-
boring copper companies. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230. The Court held a suit by a
state is not the same as a suit between private parties. Id.
138. Massachusetts H, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
139. Id. at 1455.
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Specifically, the Court found that Massachusetts had demon-
strated the requisite injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability to
meet the Article III standing requirements. 140 Massachusetts alleged
that the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere was con-
tributing to an increase in global warming. 14 1 The State also alleged
that experts had reached a "strong consensus" that global warming
was causing a rise in sea levels which threatened Massachusetts'
coastal land, causing Massachusetts injury in its capacity as
landowner.142
As for traceability, the Court established that the "EPA d[id] not
dispute the existence of a causal connection between man-made green-
house gas emissions and global warming."14 3 Petitioners alleged that
the U.S. transportation sector emitted more than 6% of worldwide car-
bon dioxide emissions.'4 The Court concluded that motor-vehicle
emissions "ma[d]e a meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas con-
centrations."145 Agreeing with Judge Tatel's observation that the
EPA would not bother with its current voluntary reduction programs
if it believed that emission reductions would have no effect on global
warming, the Court reasoned that a favorable decision would reduce-
at least to some extent-the harm to Massachusetts. 146 Since Massa-
chusetts had met the injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability re-
quirements, the Court held that petitioners had standing to challenge
the denial of the rulemaking petition.14
7
The Court next addressed the merits. First, the Court distin-
guished an administrative agency's decision not to initiate an enforce-
ment action from an administrative agency's denial of a petition for
rulemaking. 148 In the case of the latter, the Court determined it could
reverse action it found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."14 9 The Court had
"little trouble concluding" that section 202(a)(1) authorized the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles once the
EPA had formed a judgment that these emissions contribute to cli-
mate change. 150
The majority noted that "air pollutant" was defined very broadly in
section 7602(g) to include "any air pollution agent" and that "welfare"
140. Id. at 1455-58.
141. Id. at 1455-56.
142. Id. at 1454-56.
143. Id. at 1457.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1457-58.
146. Id. at 1458.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1459.
149. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2006)).
150. Id. at 1459.
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was also defined broadly and includes "effects on... climate."151 The
Court, declaring that the statute was unambiguous, stated that the
"statutory text foreclose [d] EPA's reading" that carbon dioxide was not
an air pollutant.152 The Court disregarded the EPA's argument that
Congressional actions over the last few decades merely calling for cli-
mate change research foreclosed any reading of the CAA that would
require regulation.15 3 The Court reasoned that regulatory action does
not conflict with collaboration and research, but complements it.154
Finally, the Court determined that the EPA's reasoning for not
regulating greenhouse gas emissions was not grounded in the CAA.155
The Court recognized the EPA's authority to form a "judgment" but
stated, "the use of the word 'judgment' is not a roving license to ignore
the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise discretion with de-
fined statutory limits."156 The Court found that the EPA's "laundry
list of reasons not to regulate" were not grounded in the statute. "The
statutory question [was] whether sufficient information exists to make
an endangerment finding [on whether greenhouse gases may reasona-
bly be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare] ."157
The dissent disagreed with the majority on both the standing issue
and on the merits. Chief Justice Roberts stated that the grievances in
the case were not matters for the courts, but matters for the legisla-
tive and executive branches to resolve.1 58 The Chief Justice accused
the majority of "chang[ing] the rules" by recognizing relaxed Article
III standards because the allegations were presented by a State.159
The dissent asserted that the majority lacked support for its position
and criticized the majority's reliance on the Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per Co. case. 160
Chief Justice Roberts argued that Tennessee Copper "stood for
nothing more than a State's right, in an original jurisdiction action, to
sue in a representative capacity as parens patriae."16 1 The dissent
found that the injury alleged by petitioners did not meet the particu-
151. Id. at 1447 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 1460.
153. Id. at 1460-61.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1460-63.
156. Id. at 1462.
157. Id. at 1463.
158. Id. at 1464.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1465-66 (discussing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)).
The majority cited the case as support for a State's right to protect its sovereign
interest. Chief Justice Roberts argued the case has nothing to do with Article III
standing and highlights that none of the parties or amici had cited Tennessee
Copper in their briefs. Id.
161. Massachusetts II, 127 S. Ct. at 1464-66. The dissent claimed that the Court only
recognized that Georgia, as a quasi-sovereign, was entitled to equitable relief
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larization and imminent requirements, and that the "reliance on Mas-
sachusetts's loss of coastal land as their injury in fact ... create[d]
insurmountable problems for them with respect to causation and
redressability."'16 2 The dissent concluded, "It is ironic that the Court
today adopts a new theory of Article III standing for States without
the benefit of briefing or argument on the point."'1
6 3
As for the disagreement on the merits of the case, the dissent ac-
cused the majority of "invent[ing] a multiple-choice question that the
EPA Administrator must answer when a petition for rulemaking is
filed."164 The dissent argued that the majority had no basis for dis-
missing the EPA's justifications for its determination not to regulate
greenhouse gases under the CAA stating that, "the statute says noth-
ing at all about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer
making a judgment."16 5
The dissent stated the statute's use of "its judgment" entitled the
EPA to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc.16 6 and that the EPA satisfied the majority's reason-
ing requirement by referring to the National Research Council's
Climate Change Report stating that climate change "cannot be un-
equivocally established."167 The dissent also argued that the majority
did not determine that greenhouse gases met the first half of the defi-
nition of air pollutant-that they were an "air pollution agent or com-
bination of such agents."'16
8
IV. ANALYSIS
Massachusetts v. EPA has been hailed as a landmark decision in
environmental law. It marks judicial support for federal action on cli-
mate change. It recognizes carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under
the CAA, which could lead not only to the regulation of mobile sources
under section 202 but also stationary sources under section 111 of the
Act. The decision has potentially profound implications for the doc-
rather than settling for the legal remedy that private litigant would have had to
settle for. Id.
162. Id. at 1467-68.
163. Id. at 1466.
164. Id. at 1472. The dissent argued that under the CAA the Administrator is not
required to make a judgment whenever a petition for rulemaking is filed. Id.
165. Id. at 1474.
166. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chev-
ron stands for the proposition that an administrative agency's interpretation is
entitled to deference where it reasonably accommodates competing interests.
167. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1473-74.
168. Id. at 1475. The dissent argued that the EPA's conclusion that a substance is not
an air pollutant merely because it is a "physical, chemical .... substance or mat-
ter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air" is reasonable under
the CAA. Id. at 1460.
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trine of standing and administrative law. The decision also marks an
increased role in state participation in environmental law cases.
A. Standing: The Court Got It Right, But How Did They Get
There?
Much uncertainty and speculation surrounded how the Court
would resolve the standing issues raised in the case. In recent years,
standing in environmental cases has become somewhat like a pendu-
lum, with leniency in the application of the doctrine changing from
case to case. 16 9 With the relatively recent appointments of Chief Jus-
tice Roberts and Justice Alito, some anticipated a reversion to the
strict standards set forth in Lujan I. Onlookers were at least hoping
for a procedural clarification of the standing doctrine. Those antici-
pating clarification on the doctrine of standing did not receive it. In-
stead, the Court made the issue more confusing.
The Supreme Court in its majority opinion held that at least one
Petitioner-Massachusetts-had standing. However, rather than just
say that Massachusetts had met the requisite injury in fact, traceabil-
ity, and redressability standards, the Court took a unique, if not odd,
approach in its reasoning.
The Court outlined three rationales that could lead to Massachu-
setts's standing. First, the majority noted that "a litigant to whom
Congress has 'accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete inter-
ests'-here, the right to challenge agency action unlawfully with-
held-'can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards
for redressability and immediacy."'170 Second, the majority noted it
was highly significant that Massachusetts was a state and not a pri-
vate litigant. The Court cited three "sovereign prerogatives" surren-
dered by states to the U.S. Government and alluded that this gave
states "special solicitude" in the Court's analysis.17 Third, the major-
ity went through the standing requirements set forth in Lujan II and
determined that Massachusetts had demonstrated a sufficient injury-
in-fact, traceability, and redressabiity.172 The Supreme Court was
correct in concluding that Massachusetts had standing to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Court; however, its recognition of a "special solici-
tude" for states seems unnecessary and avoidable. So why did they do
this?
Answering this question is like answering a multiple-choice ques-
tion on an extremely difficult exam. Were they (a) attempting to show
that Massachusetts had an extraordinarily strong case and could meet
169. See supra text accompanying notes 80-94.
170. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1453 (internal citations omitted).
171. Id. at 1454-55.
172. Id. at 1455-58.
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the standing requirements under multiple rationales; (b) attempting
to provide new, more lenient standing requirements for states; (c) at-
tempting to allow Massachusetts to meet standing requirements in
this case without lowering the threshold for private litigants in future
cases; (d) all of the above; or (e) none of the above?
The Court could have found that injury-in-fact, traceability, and
redressability existed and left its reasoning at that. After all, the ma-
jority did find that Massachusetts had "a particularized injury in its
capacity as landowner" and that its unchallenged affidavits had stated
that Massachusetts's coastal land was already a victim of rising
seas. 173 As Mr. Milkey, Massachusetts's assistant attorney general
and counsel of record, stated in his oral argument, "The injury doesn't
get any more particular than states losing 200 miles of coastline."'174
The majority also found that the EPA's failure to regulate green-
house gases contributed to Massachusetts's injury as a landowner and
that incremental steps such as regulating motor vehicle emissions
could reduce its injury as a landowner.175 After all, transportation
accounts for a large and increasing output of carbon dioxide.176
Therefore, it seems that the majority had established a sufficient basis
for standing by merely relying on the Lujan II test alone.
However, the injury-in-fact relied upon by the majority had been
criticized as being too remote.17 7 Chief Justice Roberts accused the
majority of weakening the doctrine of standing.' 7 8 Justice Stevens
and the majority were criticized for being too lenient in their analysis
of Massachusetts's standing argument.1 79 If the majority had merely
relied on its application of the traditional standards, Chief Justice
Roberts would be right. The standing doctrine pendulum would move
back over to the lenient standing requirement side and onlookers
would have to wait patiently for the next standing case to see if the
change would survive. Because the majority did not solely rely on the
traditional standing requirements, it seems they recognized the possi-
bility that other courts might believe they had lowered the threshold
necessary to establish standing.
173. Id. at 1456.
174. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Massachusetts 1I, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-
1120).
175. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1447-58.
176. Greene & Schafer, supra note 36, at iii (noting that "[gliven its size and rate of
growth, any serious GHG [greenhouse gas] mitigation strategy must include the
transportation sector").
177. Jonathan Adler, Massachusetts v. EPA Heats Up Climate Policy No Less Than
Administrative Law: A Comment on Professors Watts and Wildermuth, 102 Nw.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 32 (2007).
178. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1463-71 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
179. Adler, supra note 177, at 33 (criticizing the majority for applying the standing
elements in a "most undemanding fashion.").
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Possibly, the Court did not want to encourage a flood of lawsuits
filed on behalf of large (and small) landowners against a number of
potential defendants (the EPA, energy companies, etc.). At oral argu-
ment, Justice Kennedy seemed to foreshadow this concern by asking,
"Suppose there were a big landowner that owned lots of coastline.
Would he have the same standing that you do or do you have some
special standing as a State . . . ?"180 He went on to ask this same
question about a small landowner.' 8 , It seems that the Court wanted
to distinguish Massachusetts from a private litigant. The Court was
throwing sandbags at the floodgates, so to speak, to preserve standing
as a tool for lower courts to use in resolving cases alleging injuries as a
result of global warming.
The question then becomes, were they trying to show that Massa-
chusetts had a really strong case because it was a state, or were they
trying to show that they were only lowering the bar for Massachusetts
because it was a state?
Justice Stevens argued that, "States are not normal litigants for
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction." 8 2 In establishing that
States deserve "special solicitude" in the Court's standing analysis,
the majority invoked the language of Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.:
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In
that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of
its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word as
to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its inhabitants
shall breathe pure air. 183
In addition to citing the State's "well-founded desire to preserve its
sovereign territory," the Court referred to surrendered "sovereign pre-
rogatives" implying Massachusetts would have standing to sue parens
patriae "if the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely
attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers."18 4
Chief Justice Roberts argued that parens patriae actions raise an ad-
ditional hurdle for a state litigant"-the need to show a quasi-sover-
eign interest-which "makes the required showing here harder, not
easier."' 8 5 But even if the standing requirements are more difficult
for state litigants, Massachusetts met this requirement by demon-
strating a dual injury to itself and its citizens.
Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Roberts both cited Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez supporting their respec-
180. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-
1120).
181. Id. at 15.
182. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1454.
183. Id. at 1454 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
184. Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
607 (1982)).
185. Id. at 1466 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 87:10551078
THE RETURN OF THE LORAX
tive positions.' 8 6 In Snapp, the Court identified the types of interests
a state might have as follows. A state's sovereign power allows it to
"create and enforce a legal code" and "demand recognition from other
sovereigns." A state's proprietary power allows it to "own land or par-
ticipate in a business venture." Finally, a state's quasi-sovereign
power allows the state to look after the "interests that the State has in
the well-being of its populace."18 7
As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out, Massachusetts' injury in its
capacity as landowner would not fall under the State's quasi-sovereign
interest, but rather its proprietary interest.1ss However, at oral argu-
ment, Mr. Milkey referred to the 200 miles of coastline as "both sover-
eign territory and property we actually own,"18 9 suggesting that the
injury-in-fact relied upon by the majority-Massachusetts's loss of
coastline-would cover both the State's proprietary interest and its
quasi-sovereign interest in looking after its populace.
Mr. Milkey further alleged that, "the States are showing harm not
only to them in a property sense, but in their sovereign capacity."190
Mr. Milkey referred the Court to the amicus brief of the State of Ari-
zona et al.,191 which claimed that States have special standing based
upon the sovereignty of States and their inability to regulate when
administrative decisions preempt state law. 19 2 So even if parens pa-
triae standing does raise an additional hurdle, under the majority's
reasoning, Justice Stevens seems to lump the State's "sovereign pre-
rogatives" into Massachusetts's "stake in protecting its quasi-sover-
eign" interests.193 Therefore, it seems the majority was able to both,
as Chief Justice Roberts said, "relax[ I Article III standing require-
186. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 592. Puerto Rico was attempting to sue private apple grow-
ers, parens patriae, on behalf of a small group of its citizens who claimed that
they were discriminated against in violation of federal law.
187. Id. at 601-02; see Kathryn Watts & Amy Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA-
Breaking New Ground on Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 1 (2007).
188. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1467.
189. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-
1120).
190. Id. at 14.
191. Arizona, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, and Wisconsin submitted a brief as amici
curiae.
192. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-
1120); Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers at 1, Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120) ("Such decisions injure
the States by preventing them from creating or enforcing their sovereign law, and
States should be able to seek redress for those injuries by challenging federal
administrative decisions in federal court.").
193. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1454-55; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992) (The majority entrenched the position set forth in Lujan
that the Court will not "entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's noncon-
crete interest in the proper administration of the laws.").
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ments because asserted injuries are pressed by a State" and show that
Massachusetts had a really strong case because it could show an in-
jury in all three interests set forth in Snapp.194 Regardless of the ma-
jority's reasons for recognizing a "special solicitude" for state litigants,
Massachusetts demonstrated the standing requirements set forth in
Lujan II; therefore, the Court was correct in finding that Massachu-
setts had standing to invoke the Court's jurisdiction.
The majority's opinion will surely have an impact on the doctrine of
standing. For private litigants, the traditional standing requirements
set forth in Lujan II will still apply. The Court has not raised or low-
ered the threshold for private litigants as the Court went out of its
way to emphasize the unique position of states in its analysis. As for
states acting as litigants, their position has-at least slightly-im-
proved. Had the Court merely stated that because of its interests as a
quasi-sovereign, Massachusetts had "special solicitude" in the stand-
ing analysis and then proceeded directly to the merits, the decision
would have far-reaching consequences for the doctrine of standing.195
However, the Court did not take that position, but still required the
State to satisfy a Lujan analysis. So it seems the Court is willing to
apply the Lujan II requirements somewhat less vigorously so long as
the State can also assert an interest in its capacity as a quasi-sover-
eign, but is not willing to eliminate the requirements altogether.
B. The Merits: Good Outcome, Shaky Ground
While certainly many were interested in the Court's ruling on the
standing issue, most environmentalists waited with bated breath for
the Court's decision involving carbon dioxide and its status as a poten-
tial air pollutant. The Supreme Court held that the EPA does have
authority to regulate the emission of greenhouse gases from new mo-
tor vehicles because greenhouse gases fit within the CAA definition of
air pollutant. 19 6
While the plain language of section 302(g) does support the Court's
finding,19 7 it is difficult to set aside the implications of Congressional
actions' 9 8-or perhaps more appropriately-nonaction for the past
194. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1464.
195. Id. at 1471. Even Chief Justice Roberts recognized the implications should not be
far-reaching, stating in his dissent, "The good news is that the Court's 'special
solicitude' for Massachusetts limits the future applicability of the diluted stand-
ing requirements applied in this case." Id.
196. Id. at 1462.
197. See supra section HIlA, explaining that Section 302(g) defines an air pollutant as
"any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical,
chemical, biological, radioactive .... substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters ambient air."
198. See supra section I.B, discussing Congress' stance that research and voluntary
actions are sufficient to address climate change.
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thirty years in order to conclude that greenhouse gases could be regu-
lated under section 202(a)(1).
There were two potential interpretations the Court could have
adopted. The EPA advanced an interpretation that a substance must
be an agent of air pollution in order to be an air pollutant. "Because
EPA lacks CAA regulatory authority to address global climate change,
the term 'air pollution' as used in the regulatory provisions cannot be
interpreted to encompass global climate change."199 The majority
passed over the EPA's interpretation, instead opting for the reading
offered by Petitioners who argued that the greenhouse gases associ-
ated with climate change are plainly "air pollutants" under the plain
text of the CAA. "Motor vehicles emit the physical and chemical mat-
ter carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons
into the ambient air."200
The majority is correct in noting that the language Congress used
in section 302(g) defining "air pollutant" is broad.2 0 The repeated use
of the word "any" is telling and unambiguously encompasses a wide
range of potential air pollutants. While Congress did make section
302(g) broad, and technically carbon dioxide does fit within the defini-
tion, it seems unlikely that Congress intended this result. Congress
has a history of avoiding the regulation of greenhouse gases. Congress
has enacted a number of legislative proposals relating to greenhouse
gases-all calling for additional research and eschewing mandatory
regulations.20 2 In 1990, a Senate committee included a provision to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions for motor vehicles, but the provision
was removed before the bill was sent to a full Senate vote. 20 3
In response to this history, the majority acknowledged that while
"the Congresses that drafted section 202(a)(1) might not have appreci-
ated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warm-
ing, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the CAA
199. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003); see also Brief for the Federal Respondent at 33,
Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438 ("[Glreenhouse gases are not 'agents' of air pol-
lution for regulatory purposes because they do not cause cognizable 'pollution'
within the scope of the Act's regulatory provisions.").
200. Brief for Petitioners at 24, Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (No. 05-1120).
201. Section 302(g) reads "The term 'air pollutant' means any pollution agent or com-
bination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive,
(including source, material, special nuclear material, and byproduct material)
substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.
Such term includes any precursors to the formation of any air pollutant, to the
extent the Administrator has identified such precursor or precursors for the par-
ticular purpose for which the term 'air pollutant' is used." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g)
(2006) (emphasis added).
202. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
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obsolete."20 4 While the holding may not be on completely solid
ground, the Supreme Court did not err in finding that the EPA has
authority under section 202(a)(1) because greenhouse gases fit within
the definition of air pollutant set forth in section 302(g).20 5
After finding that the EPA did have the authority, the Court an-
swered the question of whether the EPA's stated reasons for failing to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles were con-
sistent with the statute. The Court did not err when it held that the
EPA's reasoning was divorced from the statutory text. Section
202(a)(1) does condition the EPA's action on its formation of a "judg-
ment." However, it also states that judgment must relate to whether
the emission of any air pollutants "cause [s], or contribute [s] to, air pol-
lution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare." This standard is precautionary and allows the EPA to
take action before actual harm occurs. Because this standard is pre-
cautionary and because the EPA has acknowledged the existence of
global warming and has initiated some voluntary emission reduction
programs in the past, at some point the EPA will have to make an
endangerment finding related to greenhouse gases. This will require
regulation either under the CAA or more likely under some future
Congressional legislation.
C. The Implications
1. The Administration
The Supreme Court did not order the EPA to regulate greenhouse
gases. The Court remanded the case for the EPA to reconsider its de-
nial of the petition requesting regulation of the greenhouse gases asso-
ciated with climate change under section 202(a)(1). 206 If the EPA
decides not to regulate, it must provide an adequate justification
based on the statutory text. Realistically, however, the Court has
forced the EPA's hand.
Given the EPA's pronouncements on climate change and global
warming in the past, it will be difficult for the EPA to deny that cli-
mate change cannot "reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare" and still retain credibility. In the EPA's original
order denying the rulemaking request, the EPA did not discount the
existence of global climate change and the potential effects. In fact,
the EPA stated, "We agree with the President [then-President George
204. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1462.
205. See supra text accompanying note 201.
206. Massachusetts 11, 127 S. Ct. at 1463.
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W. Bush] that 'we must address the issue of global climate
change.'" 2
0 7
While the EPA now has the authority to regulate greenhouse gases
under section 202 and it seems inevitable that the EPA will indeed
have to regulate greenhouse gases under this provision (barring inter-
vention from Congress), it is not likely to occur anytime soon. Since
the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA does not require the EPA to reg-
ulate carbon dioxide under the CAA until it makes an endangerment
finding, the EPA still has room to stall. However, the decision does
place pressure on the legislative and executive branches to take more
immediate action on the issue of climate change.
The day after the Supreme Court's ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA,
then-President Bush remarked,
First of all, the decision of the Supreme Court we take very seriously. It's the
new law of the land .... My attitude is, is that we have laid out a plan that
will affect greenhouse gases that come from automobiles by having a
mandatory fuel standard that insists upon using 35 billion gallons of alterna-
tive fuels by 2017, which will reduce our gasoline usage by 20 percent and halt
the growth in greenhouse gases that emanate from automobiles. In other
words, there is a remedy available for Congress.
2 0 8
Then-President Bush gave no indication that he would order the EPA
to regulate emissions under section 202(a)(1), indicating that the Bush
Administration felt that current measures were sufficient, and basi-
cally passed the buck to Congress. 209 However, the decision in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA seems to suggest otherwise, so that at the very least,
future administrations will have to make the determination that
greenhouse gases represent a danger to public health or welfare.
Then-President Bush went on to add, "I have said that [climate
change] is a serious problem. I recognize that man is contributing
greenhouse gases ... "210 However, then-President Bush made it
clear that he would not approve anything that could potentially re-
strain economic growth. 2 11 On May 16, 2007, then-President Bush
made a formal response to the Massachusetts v. EPA opinion, and is-
207. Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,929 (Sept. 8, 2003).
208. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Emergency Supplemental (Apr. 3,
2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070403.html.
209. Felicity Barringer & William Yardley, Bush Splits With Congress and States on
Emissions, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 4, 2007, at Al; see also Juliet Eilperin & R. Jeffrey
Smith, EPA Won't Act on Emissions This Year, WASH. POST, July 11, 2008, at Al
(reporting fifteen months after the Supreme Court's decision was announced that
the "Bush Administration has decided not to take any new steps to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions ... despite pressure ... that new regulation is appro-
priate now." Instead the EPA is seeking additional comments.).
210. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Emergency Supplemental (Apr. 3,
2007), httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/0420070403.html.
211. Id. (President Bush confirmed that "anything that happens cannot hurt economic
growth.").
2009] 1083
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sued an executive order addressing the decision. The order required
the EPA and the Departments of Transportation, Energy, and Agri-
culture "to protect the environment with respect to greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles, nonroad vehicles, and nonroad en-
gines, in a manner consistent with sound science, analysis of benefits
and costs, public safety, and economic growth" utilizing President
Bush's "Twenty in Ten" plan.2 1
2
It was significant that then-President Bush involved four separate
administrative entities in the order because it made the odds of ac-
complishing anything meaningful in the final days of the Bush Admin-
istration very low and it did not specifically direct the EPA to act
concerning "public health and welfare" as section 202(a)(1) requires,
but instead gave consideration to economic issues.2 13 After the deci-
sion was released, then-President Bush invited representatives from
the world's leading economies to take part in a summit lead by the
Secretary of State to establish voluntary goals for reducing green-
house gas emissions.2 14 It seems that while the Bush Administration
acknowledged the Massachusetts decision, it gave only an illusion of
deference to it.
Even if the decision did not compel the Bush Administration to act
quickly and promulgate regulations for greenhouse gases under sec-
tion 202(a)(1), it did not foreclose the possibility that the present
Obama Administration will take action. 2 1 5 Since President Obama
was committed to addressing global warming on the campaign trail, it
is possible that administrative action under the CAA may not be too
far down the road.
212. Exec. Order No. 13,432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27,717 (2007) (President Bush's "Twenty in
Ten" plan calls for cutbacks in gas consumption by twenty percent in the next ten
years); see also President George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses CAFE and
Alternative Fuel Standards (May 14, 2007), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2007/05/20070514-4.html ("Last month, the Supreme Court ruled that
the EPA must take action under the Clean Air Act regarding greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles. So today, I'm directing the EPA and the Depart-
ment of Transportation, Energy, and Agriculture to take the first steps toward
regulations that would cut gasoline consumption and greenhouse gas emissions
from motor vehicles, using my 20-in-10 plan as a starting point.").
213. See Exec. Order No. 13,432, 72 Fed. Reg. 27,717 (Section 1 clearly states, "To
protect the environment ... in a manner consistent with ... economic growth.").
214. Michael Fletcher, Bush Sets Emissions Summit: World Powers Are Invited to Dis-
cuss Climate Change, Growth, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2007.
215. Interview by Ray Suarez with Carol Browner, Former EPA Administrator (Apr.
2, 2007), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-juneO7/scotus_04-02.html.
Former EPA Administrator Carol Browner stated, "The court very clearly said
that EPA can regulate greenhouse gases under the existing Clean Air Act, that
they do not need to go to Congress and get new authority. I doubt this adminis-
tration, the Bush Administration, is going to take advantage of that, but cer-
tainly I think future administrations will." Id.
1084 [Vol. 87:1055
2009] THE RETURN OF THE LORAX 1085
2. Congress
The CAA was enacted in the 1970s in response to localized pollu-
tants that led to smog and other air conditions.216 As such, it may not
be the best tool to regulate greenhouse gases-despite the fact that
the Court ruled that carbon dioxide could be regulated under section
202(a)(1). This places increased pressure on Congress to enact better
legislation.2 17 Connecticut Senator Joseph Lieberman, a sponsor of
many greenhouse gas reduction bills, stated that the Supreme Court's
decision had the effect of "knocking down yet another empty excuse for
inaction."218
Proposals calling for the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
have been floating around Congress for several years now. Senators
McCain and Lieberman first introduced their Climate Stewardship
Act in 2003, but the Senate rejected the measure.2 19 The bill was re-
introduced in 2005 where it faced the same fate.2 20 In the first few
months of 2007, no less than five proposals to control greenhouse gas
emissions were introduced in the Senate.221 Measures range from
limiting carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles on a gram per
mile basis to establishing greenhouse gas tradable allowance sys-
tems.22 2 The number of proposals introduced is increasing as discus-
sion is expected to begin this fall.223
216. See supra section II.B.
217. Robert Barnes & Juliet Eilperin, High Court Faults EPA Inaction on Emissions
Critics of Bush Stance on Warming Claim Victory, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2007, at
Al. John Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and
Representative for Michigan, stated, "While I still believe Congress did not in-
tend for the Clean Air Act to regulate greenhouse gases, the Supreme Court has
made its decision and the matter is now settled. Today's ruling provides another
compelling reason why Congress must enact, and the president must sign, com-
prehensive climate change legislation." Id.
218. Joel Lang & Michael Regan, Court's Climate Ruling Hailed May Help States
Fight Greenhouse Emissions, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 3, 2007.
219. Press Release, Joe Lieberman U.S. Senate, Lieberman, McCain Reintroduce Cli-
mate Stewardship and Innovation Act (Jan. 12, 2007), http://lieberman.senate.
gov/newsroomlrelease.cfm?id=267559. The bill called for a cap and trade system
with the goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions to 2000 levels by the year
2010. Id.
220. Id.
221. Senate Greenhouse Gas Cap-And-Trade Proposals in the 110th Congress, PEW
CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, Feb. 2007, available at http://www.
pewclimate.org/docUploads/Cap%2Dand%2Dtrade%20bills%201 10th%5FFeb5%
2Epdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
222. Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. § 707 (2007); Cli-
mate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 280, 110th Cong. (2007).
223. See Steven Mufson, 2 Senators to Unveil Climate Bill: Plan Would Auction Emis-
sion Allowances, Cut Greenhouse Gases, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2007, at D3. A
number of additional proposals have been introduced in both the House and the
Senate since the Supreme Court's Decision. See Global Climate and Ozone Layer
Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3448, 110th Cong. (2007); Clean Air/Climate Change
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The CAA is a tool that can be used to regulate greenhouse gases,
however, it is not the best tool because it was originally drafted with
local air pollutants in mind. If Congress does not enact new legisla-
tion that can more effectively manage greenhouse gas emissions, then
it will have to accept potential EPA regulations to manage global cli-
mate change in its place. Because of the divisive nature of climate
change regulations and the ramifications these regulations could have
on industry, the issue would be better addressed by Congress rather
than delegated to an administrative agency.
3. The States
In addition to pressuring the federal government into taking ac-
tion, the Supreme Court's decision is likely to trigger an increase in
state and local action. State and local governments have already
played a positive role in encouraging greenhouse gas reductions, but
this decision should buoy them to continue doing so. For example,
California passed a law requiring greenhouse gas emissions to be re-
duced to 1990 levels by 2020.224 Hawaii and New Jersey have passed
similar legislation, and more states are sure to follow.
2 25
The states have been innovators on the climate change front. At
least forty states have introduced some type of climate change legisla-
tion. 226 Ten northeastern states have formed the Northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the first mandatory carbon trading system
in the United States, which will cover fossil-fuel burning power plants
operating over a specified capacity. 2 27 Following that collaboration,
six western states and two Canadian provinces have formed the West-
ern Regional Climate Initiative and are developing a market-based
system to achieve a regional greenhouse reduction goal.
2 2 8
Act of 2007, S. 1168, 110th Cong. (2007); Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590,
110th Cong. (2007); Global Warming Reduction Act of 2007, S. 485, 110th Cong.
(2007).
224. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 38550 (West 2007).
225. See Global Warming Response Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2C-37 (West 2007) (set-
ting a mandatory limit on greenhouse gas emissions not to exceed 1990 levels by
2020); Global Warming Solutions Act of 2007, 2007 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 234
(requiring the state to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to levels at or below 1990
levels by 2020).
226. Barringer & Yardley, supra note 209 (reporting that according the National Con-
ference of State Legislatures "[alt least 300 bills have been filed in 40 states that
address heat-trapping gases and climate change in some form").
227. Eric B. Rothenberg & John Rousakis, Exploring the Carbon Trading Landscape,
N.Y. L.J., July 16, 2007, at 8 (The participating states include Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Rhode Island, and Vermont.).
228. Id. The participating states include Arizona, California, New Mexico, Oregon,
Utah, and Washington as well as two Canadian provinces British Columbia and
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California has also led the way among the states (and the Federal
Government) in enacting tougher standards that limit the amount of
carbon dioxide gases that can be emitted from motor vehicles. Ten
other states have adopted California's tougher rules with more in the
process of adopting them.2 29 However, before these tougher stan-
dards can take effect, California must receive a waiver from the EPA.
Once California receives the waiver, other states can follow in imple-
menting them.230
California submitted a waiver request in 2005, but the EPA was
concerned over its authority to issue the waiver and wanted to hold off
on the issue until after the Supreme Court had addressed its authority
in Massachusetts v. EPA.231 The automobile industry challenged the
tougher rules in Central Valley Chrysler v. Witherspoon, but the case
was placed on hold until after the Supreme Court's decision was an-
nounced. 23 2 The decision should be very beneficial to California's po-
sition since the Supreme Court announced both that the greenhouse
gases California seeks to control can be classified as air pollutants and
that the EPA has the authority to regulate them.23 3 However, the
EPA stated, "As far as the impact of the Supreme Court decision on
EPA's [own] authority, EPA is reviewing the court decision and will
move forward in a deliberate manner."2 34
Other states currently involved in climate change litigation can
find support from the Supreme Court's ruling as well.235 States now
have the opportunity to play an increasingly important role. States
can continue to fill the void of federal inaction on this important issue.
The Supreme Court has recognized the state's unique position and
need to protect its quasi-sovereign rights. Now that states have "spe-
Manitoba. A full listing of states joining as observers is available at http://www.
westernclimateinitiative.org.
229. John Gray, Where Do We Go From Here? Reconsidering Global Warming After
Massachusetts v. EPA, ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP., May 2, 2007, at 13.
230. 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2006). Clean Air Act § 209 allows California to promulgate
tougher standards but it must obtain a waiver from the EPA. Once a waiver is
obtained than other states are also free to adopt California's standards. Id.
231. Sholnn Freeman, State's Adopt California's Greenhouse Gas Limits, WASH. POST,
Jan. 3, 2006, at D1; Dean Scott, EPA Readying Proposal on California Waiver
After High Court's Climate Change Decision, ENV'T. REP. (BNA), Apr. 6, 2007, at
799.
232. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. et al. v. Witherspoon, 2007 WL 135688 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 16, 2007).
233. Jerry Brown, California's Attorney General stated the ruling "makes it very clear
that California has a right to regulate greenhouse gases." Bob Egelko, Ruling
Helps California Battle Global Warming Supreme Court Affirms that States Can
Limit Greenhouse Gases, Attorney General Says, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/C/a/2007/04/03/MNGHCPOJK
31.DTL (last visited Jan. 9, 2009); see Gray, supra note 229.
234. Scott, supra note 231.
235. Lang & Regan, supra note 218.
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cial solicitude" in the standing analysis, State Attorney Generals can
play a more active role. Where private environmental groups are
likely to be unsuccessful, a State Attorney General may have success
in supporting concerned citizens. 2 36
4. Industry and Economy
Petitioners were testing the waters with this case. The majority of
greenhouse gas emissions in this country come from industry and elec-
tricity generation.23 7 Section 111 of the CAA requires the EPA Ad-
ministrator to set emissions standards for certain "categories of
stationary sources." 238 The Administrator "shall include a category of
sources in such list if in his judgment it causes, or contributes signifi-
cantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare." 239
Industry does not want to take the risk and uncertainty of an unfa-
vorable judicial ruling. Already, industry groups have begun to lobby
Congress, requesting mandatory emissions caps.24 0 Executives of the
Big Three 24 1 auto companies testified in the House that they sup-
ported carbon dioxide regulation. 24 2 They would rather face the possi-
bility of reasonable regulations now than face the unknown. If the
federal government continues to delay taking action, industries facing
regulation could see a drastic rise in their operating costs.
By asking for mandatory regulations, industry groups can stabilize
their operations. In addition, these corporations can take advantage
of the goodwill created by their "altruistic" action and take advantage
of the building environmental movement with consumers. 2 43 Many
companies have already begun to develop voluntary programs in an-
ticipation of mandatory regulations to come.
24 4
236. Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA, 112
PENN ST. L. REV 1 (2007).
237. Greene & Schafer, supra note 36, at iii.
238. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
239. Id.
240. Barringer & Yardley, supra note 209.
241. The Big Three U.S. automobile companies are General Motors, Ford, and
Chrysler.
242. Barringer & Yardley, supra note 209.
243. For example, G.E. has adopted Ecoimagination and British Petroleum has
adopted Beyond Petroleum
244. See generally Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Pol-
icy Choices, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 341, 391 (2002) (stating that British Petroleum,
DuPont, Lockheed Martin, Ontario Power, Shell, and United Technologies are all
developing voluntary emissions reduction and trading programs).
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Perhaps the largest impact the decision will have is fast-tracking
legislation for the imposition of a carbon credit trading system. 245 Eu-
rope and Britain already have mandatory limits in place regulating
carbon markets.24 6 Australia is in the process of implementing its
own limits. 24 7 Several states have formed regional markets, and the
Chicago Climate Exchange already operates a market for companies
participating in voluntary limits. Trading on the European market
amounted to $24.4 billion in 2006, and the Chicago Climate Exchange
traded $38 million in voluntary activity in 2006.248 Industry recog-
nizes carbon trading as a potential tool to help the bottom line of busi-
nesses in the face of mandatory regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of global climate change is highly debated, and a political
compromise will not be forced by the decision of the Supreme Court.
Politicians will continue to have doubts about the severity of the situa-
tion and the potential consequences of inaction despite the Supreme
Court's endorsement that it is a concrete and imminent threat to the
well-being of Massachusetts and others in kind. However, the opinion
may coerce some action and make it easier for states to pick up the
slack of federal inaction on the issue.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court determined that carbon di-
oxide is an air pollutant under section 302(g) of the CAA and can be
regulated by section 202(a)(1); however, it did not order the EPA to do
so. Nevertheless, the decision still lends judicial support for the need
to take action on global climate change. Not only did the decision lend
support to environmental advocates, but it also recognized States as
dominant players in the field-a role that many seem willing and able
to take on.
With the start of a new administration, increasing support from
industry, and a Supreme Court that seems lenient toward global
warming litigation, the pressure is increasing on elected officials to
take action sooner rather than later. While Massachusetts v. EPA did
not give standing to the trees, it did give the Lorax-or at least the
states in its place-a fighting chance.
249
245. Greene & Schafer, supra note 36, at v (Generally, there are three types of emis-
sion trading programs: reduction credit trading, emissions rate averaging, and
cap-and-trade programs.).
246. Rothenberg & Rousakis, supra note 227, at 1-3.
247. Id. at 3.
248. Id.
249. Justice Douglas' dissent in Sierra Club argued that "[c]ontemporary public con-
cern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of
standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation." Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). While
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So...
Catch!" calls the Once-ler.
He lets something fall.
"It's a Truffala Seed.
It's the last one of all!
You're in charge of the last of the Truffala Seeds.
And Truffala Trees are what everyone needs.
Plant a new Truffala. Treat it with care.
Give it clean water. And feed it fresh air.
Grow a forest. Protect it from axes that hack.
Then the Lorax
and all of his friends
may come back.
2 5 0
Massachusetts v. EPA did not confer standing upon the earth or the trees, at least
they gave their representatives some added ground to stand on.
250. DR. SEuss, supra note 1, at 61.
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